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FINANCING THE AIR TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 
D. J. Lloyd-Jones 
Gent lemen: It is a pleasure to be here today to speak in such a love ly 
location and on a subject close to my heart. It is a particular pleasure to 
be on the same program with Dr. George James with whom I have had a warm 
association for many years. I say this in spite of the fact that Dr. James 
has just made some capital requirement forecasts substantially higher than 
I had anticipated. The $20 billion capital requirement that George is 
forecasting for the second half of the 1970's is final confirmation that the 
aerospace manufacturers have infiltrated the ATA. 
I know you f ve s_pent a lot of time this week, and some of las t week, on 
the basic characteristics of the industry. I want to touch on them briefly 
today to show how they affect the financing requirements and patterns of the 
i.ndustry. (Chart I) First of all, we are highly susceptible to the business 
cycle. This means that we have to choose our financial timing carefully in 
order to get the best possible interest rates available. There are in fact 
times when we cannot finance at all, when things are at the bottom. It also 
means that our investors, our lenders, tend to request higher interest rates 
or expect higher rates of return on their equity from us than they do from more 
stable industries, such as other utility industries whose earnings tend to be 
reasonably stable.percentages. 
Second, we are a. ser~ice industry;therefore we cannot store our product. 
This fact has a fairly major effect on the amount of equipment we buy and 
therefore the. amount of capital investment that we make. 
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Third, we are closely government regulated. We are regulated with 
regard to the routes we can fly and the rates we may charge. Nonetheless 
we are highly competitive and the combination of this fact and our close 
regulation has tended in the past to drive the industry periodically into 
an over- capacity posture. This puts heavy burdens on the financial officers, 
and the financial resources of the airlines. 
Fifth, "e are a high growth industry, so that, if we were normal in 
all other respects, w~ would have a fairly high rate of new equipment 
acquisitions. We are not normal in all other respects, however. We have a 
rapid technological cycle. Since the airlines first became significant 
entities in transportation in the early 1930's, there has been a major 
technological revolution in the equipment we operate on the average of about 
every seven years. Therefore, we are capital hungry and that is what I am 
going to be talki.ng about to a very large degree today. Finally, seasonality 
enters into our economic picture in that we must equip our fleets to satisfy 
a reasonable percenrage of peak demand. In the case of American Airlines, 
our seasonal peak falls in the summertime on the east-west routes. New York-
Los Angeles traffic, for example, may be 50% higher in the month of August 
than it is on an average day in the month of February. 
The l1Four Seasons" of Airline Financing 
Let me turn now to a historical review of airline financing because I 
think some historical perspective is necessary to understand how we got to where 
we are today and how we can, hopefully, finance the requirements of the future. 
Season I in airline financing I will date as including all years up until the 
end of 1954. This date was chosen because this was when the manufacturers 
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first approached the airlines to purchase the new jets, the 707's, DC-S's. 
Now, let's look at the balance sheet just before that happened. (Chart II) 
We had a fairly comfortable working capital level relative to about half a 
billion in operating property. Other assets were insignificant and debt 
was a minor factor, $214 million or 27% of our total capitalization. The 
bulk of our capitalization, 71%, was stockholders' equity. Outside of a few 
really minor debt agreements including some RFC financing back in the 1930's, 
a small amount in the 1940's, and some insignificant insurance company 
financing in the 1950's, we had financed our growth and our new equipment 
throughout this time period by stockholder equity: new equity issues, retained 
earnings and internal cash generation. This period then can be called the 
equity period and it is the first season of airline financing. 
Now let's look at the ratios that come out of the simplified balance sheet 
that we just saw. (Chart III) First of all the current ratio (the current 
assets divided by the current liabilities) was about 1.4. That's a healthy 
ratio. We've learned to live with a lot lower ratio than that since 1954. 
The debt to equity ratio was 0.4, a very insignificant amount of debt and a 
very healthy situation. There were no leases, sO,even if you include 
capitalized leases, the ratio is still 0.4. Finally, we were covering our 
interest charges 13.3 times through internally generated cash flow. Based on 
these healthy financial ratios, I think you can see why the insurance companies 
became interested in financing the jet program for the airlines in the period 
1955 to 1959. We were healthy, we had a lot of cash flow and we were buying 
a product which offered true productivity improvement to the airlines. Financing 
the first jet purchases then was not too difficult a job. 
- 4 -
The next chart (Chart IV) shows what aircraft commitments were made by 
the major U.S. airlines in the 1955 to 1959 time period. These were virtually 
all 707 and DC-8 aircraft. There were 262 of them committed for in this time 
period. The total commitment turned out to be $1.5 billion for aircraft and 
a grand total, adding in ground and other commitments necessary to support 
this equipment, of $2.2 billion. Comparing that commitment of $2.2 billion 
to the capitilization base at the beginning of the period of $780 million 
results in a ratio of commitment to capital base of 2.B. I will be referring 
to that same ,'atio as we go along through the various periods of financing. 
The 2.8 was as high as any ratio that we have had since the second World War. 
But since '¥;e had started with a very strong balance sheet, it was not a very 
difficlllt c"::!'lllcing problem. How did we do it? 
In the p .":iod 1955 to 1959, there was $2.2 billion of capital expenditures, 
as I just m0ntioned. (Chart V) We also paid out some dividends, about 770 
of our total 'capital usage was dividends, so about $2.3 - $2.4 billion had to 
be raised. 55% came from internal sources, depreciation plus earnings and 
35% came from debt. $841 million of debt was raised in that period on top of 
the $214 million we had had in the 1954 base year. So we quintrupled our debt 
in this four year time period and over 9070 of it came out of the insurance 
companies. In addition there was an insignificant amount of lease financing 
and there was a little bit of equity financing, but less than 8% of the total. 
I have called this time period Season II, the insurance company period, a time 
when almost all external financing was senior long-term debt placed with insurance 
companies. 
" 
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Q. What forms did these loans take? 
A. They took various forms, but generally speaking they were unsecured, senior 
debt. Guaranteed lease obligations, for example, are senior to these 
insurance obligations. 
Q. The interest rates? 
A. " The interest rates during this period were delightful by todays' standards -
in the neighborhood of 4~% or 4t%. A lot of these original loans have been 
re-negotiated since and the interest rates have been re-negotiated upwards. 
We have reviewed how we sourced our funds in the 1955-1959 time period. 
Our year-end 1959 balance sheet is shown on Chart VI. Compared to 1954 our 
working capital had risen to $188 million, not a significant increase. Our 
operating property, on the other hand, had risen by about a billion dollars 
to a billion five hundred and sixty two million dollars and our other assets 
had just about quadrupled. They were $71 million in 1954 and they were $309 
million at year end 1959. The balance sheet then, had changed quite drastically. 
You recall that the stockholder equity was over 70% at the end of 1954; at 
year-end 1959 it was 43% and debt had risen to 51%. In dollar terms we had 
increased to almost $1.1 billion from $214 million in debt, and in equity we had 
gone from $551 million to $880 million. So, for the first time we were beginning 
to see heavy use of debt financing by the airline industry. Of this total of 
$1.1 billion, $706 million was in the hands of the insurance companies at the 
end of 1959, a little better than 2/3 of the ent.ire debt of the industry. 
The ratios that result from that balance sheet are shown on Chart VII. The 
current ratio hasn't changed very much since 1954. The debt-equity ratio, however, 
had gone from 0.4 to 1.2, so we were then over 50% debt. Inclusion of leases 
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doesn't really change these figures very much because we hadn't turned to 
leasing at all heavily at that point in time. One key ratio had worsened 
dramatically. Our times interest coverage had dropped from thirteen fold 
to three fold and it was just about at this point that the insurance companies 
began to get a little nervous about loaning more money to the airline industry. 
There were additional technological developments in the early 1960's, 
however, and efficiency required their purchase. The three-engine jet, the 
727 came along, the two-engine jet., the BAC's and the DC-9's Came along and 
the industry required additional four-engine jets to retire some of its older 
piston equipment and to meet growth. So, in this time period we ordered an 
additional 842 total aircraft (Chart VIII) with a dollar value, including 
necessary ground facilities, of $4.2 billion. Now, that was a lot of money, 
but compared to the year-end 1959 capital base, the commitment was small 
relative to the early jet acquisition program. Our capitalization, debt plus 
equity, at the end of 1959 had been $2.1 billion. Our 1960-1965 commitments 
of $4.3 billion result in a ratio to base capitilization of 2.1. That figure 
compares to the 2.8 ratio in the latter half of the 1950's. 
On Chart IX we see the $4.2 billion in capital expenditures plus another 
$233 million in dividends. This period I have called the third season of 
airline financing because we were able to finance a very high percentage of our 
commitments through internal cash flow, from depreciation and from quite healthy 
profits in the 1963-1965 period. We did have to turn to debt to some degree -
$854 million - but it was only 19% of the total sourcing of capital during 
this time period. There was little insurance money in this period and leasing 
and equity financing were not a major factor. So the key to this entire period 
was the ability we had to finance our commitments from internal sources. 
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Adding the 1960-1965 cash flows to the balance sheet of 1959, you derive 
the picture shown in Chart X. Working capital and operating property had each 
about doubled from 1959 and other assets were up about 50? from the prior total. 
Total debt had risen to $1.9 billion compared from just over one billion at the 
end of 1959, but had declined as a percentage to 45% of our total capitalization. 
Leases still played a nominal role in our balance sheet. Stockholder equity 
had just about doubled rising to $1.6 billion from $880 million at the end 
of 1959. 
We still, however, had more debt than equity as shown in the next slide. 
(Chart XI) The current ratio was still running along at about the same level, 
no problem. The debt-equity ratio had actually improved a little bit between 
1959 and 1965. If you add the nominal leasing- that had been done, we had just 
about held our own. We did improve our times interest coverage: we got it 
back to 6.6 from the level of 3.1 that it had hit in 1959. That was the picture 
at the end of that era as we came into the most difficult financing period that 
the airlines have had since World War II. 
Q. Would you define times interest coverage? 
A. It's the internal generation of cash divided by the interest commitment of 
the carriers. 
We had bought 262 aircraft in the 1955-1959 time period (Chart XII); 842 
aircraft in the 1960-1965 time period; and in ,the 1966-1971 time period we 
committed for 912 aircraft. These were a lot more expensive aircraft, since 
inflation really started to bite into us in the latter 1960's. We ordered 
214 of the old narrow bodied four-engine jets, we ordered 260 more three-engine 
727's,with the 727-200's representing a large proportion of this number. We 
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also ordered some twin engine jets - 143 of them. The bulk of the dollars, 
however, went to order 121 747'5 and 174 of the DC-lO and L-1011 variety. The 
total commitment for aircraft for the period reached just under ten billion 
dollars. Including the ground equipment, facilities, etc., the total commitment 
in this time period was $11.9 billion. Now let's again compare that figure to 
the capital base that we had entering the period. The capital base at the end 
of 1965 was $4.2 billion which results in a commitment to capitalization ratio 
of 2.8. This is the same ratio that we had had in the late 1950's; in between 
it had been 2.1. 
On the face of it then our problem was no more difficult in the late 1960's 
than it had been back in the late 1950's, but that was not really the case. We 
didn't have the same balance sheet in 1965, that we had had before we ordered 
the first jets in 1954. Most financing sources were either drying up, had dried 
up or had become extremely expensive. We were beginning to get into an 
inflationary period, interest rates were rising for everyone, but they were 
rising more rapidly for the kind of credit that the airlines represented than 
for other kinds of corporations because of our relatively poorer balance sheets 
and erratic earnings. Insurance companies were not willing to extend further 
unsecured senior money. (Chart XIII) Prospective equity investors were looking 
for higher dividend yields because of inflation and, after about 1967, were turned 
away by declining airline stock prices. So, we came into this period, not with 
a bigger commitment problem, but with a bigger balance sheet problem, and a much 
more adverse financing environment than we had had previously. I call this 
period the fourth season or the "get it where you can" season • 
.371 
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There were three sub-phases to this period. The first phase was use of 
subordinated convertible debenture financing in order to attract the insurance 
companies by giving them a sweetener in the form of an equity kicker. The 
second phase was bank financing and the third phase was lease financing. Those 
last two phases represent the least desirable types of financing that the 
airlines can do. We had to turn to them as an industry because other sources 
were unavailable. They were generally more expensive; nonetheless we had to 
use them. 
Q. Those are sort of the classic money sources. I understand that there are 
other places like oil companies that have money. How do you get money 
out of something like that? 
A. Out of an oil company? It's quite difficult if you're thinking in terms 
of direct investment. Airlines normally don't get direct debt financing 
out of an oil company until they are really in pretty bad shape. Then they 
may give it to you. 
Q. Why shouldn't they care about you being in bad shape? 
A. Because thex want to collect their money. 
Q. Oh, I see. 
A. You'll find that carriers really on the ropes may get Some oil company 
financing, but it's just to keep the carrier going and hopefully to collect 
some back debts. In those cases the oil comp·nj."s are already so far in, 
they've got to go little bit more. If you're ::, ·.king lease financing by 
oil companies, you run into real problems with the Internal Revenue Service, 
when you start to deal with other than financial institutinns. To be sure 
that you have tax credits, you really have to be a financial institution. 
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Let's take a look now at where the insurance companies stood in the 
airline financing picture in 1968, the middle of this last time period. (Chart XIV) 
We've already seen that back in the late 1950's they had financed two-thirds of 
the original jet acquisitions and accounted for 90% of the direct debt. In the 
next ten years they represented only 28.5% of the total debt sourcing done by 
the airlines. Even that financing took a different form, as we will see in just 
a moment. Seven companies that you're all very familiar with, accounted for the 
large majority of the airline loans. The Metropolitan has the heaviest pOSition, 
they have about $600 million in the airlines, the Prudential, $500 million, and 
just a little bit behind them, the Equitable at $220 million and then Hancock, 
Aetna, MONY, Connecticut General and a batch of others make up the remainder. 
That is a very heavy concentration, as Mr. Nader says, but only a handful of 
insurance companies had the assets in this time period to loan the kinds of 
monies that the airlines needed and never in my experience have these companies 
in any way attempted to exert control. 
There was then a small expansion in insurance company lending and it came 
in 1966 and 1967. (Chart XV) As an industry we had trifled with convertible 
subordinated financing prior to this time period, but I really do characterize 
it as trifling. There had been a little bit in 1958, a nominal amount in 1961, 
and one issue in 1964. Just at the end of 1965 the real push on subordinated 
convertible financing began, with a $53 million issue at 4%, which I believe 
was ours. Then there was a batch of them in 1966 and 1967. You could pick up 
the paper practically every day and find that some airline was doing subordinated 
convertible financing. It was cheap and the insurance companies would take 
that kind of a piece of paper whereas they wouldn't take senior debt financing. 
J'73 
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After 1967, however, airline security prices started to fall out of bed. As 
a result, convertible financing decreased s~arply in 1968. Then we had an 
aberration in 1969. As you may recall, when Pan Am's stock price got down 
to a low level and Pan Am's total value in the market place fell slightly 
below $300 million dollars, International Leisure made an attempt to try and 
take control of Pan Am. Pan Am shrewdly used that run-up in their stock 
price to finance. They issued a fairly sizable subordinated convertible 
debenture issue. TWA rode on Pan Am's coat tails, since their stock price 
had risen with Pan Am's, and they also did a subordinated issue. Those two 
issues accounted for the $325 million in 1969. The 1970 financing was Eastern 
Air Line's. It is the only subordinated convertible debenture that I can 
recall that carried an 8% coupon rate. It was issued when Eastern's stock 
was selling at 13, or thereabouts, and'the conversion price was set between 
15 and 16. It was a very, very expensive kind of finanCing, but it was all 
that .was available to Eastern at the time. Excluding these aberrations, this 
phase one of season four ended in the third or fourth quarter of 1967.and 
subordinated convertible markets became closed for airline financing purposes. 
Q. Must airlines have senior lender approval when it's a bond issue? 
A.Not if it's a subordinated issue - unless, of course, the airline has reached 
its limit for such financing contained in its loan covenants. 
Q. Does the zero in the 1970 debt represent conversion or does it represent 
laying off of some airlines? 
A. It represents conversions. The conversion price as I mentioned on Eastern 
was 16 or a little below. Eastern's stock price went right through that 
level in 1971 and they called. Two of American's issues were convertible 
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at 31 3/4; we called them late last year, and finished the conversion 
in January. When you get stock prices that permit yoU to convert these 
issues, you try and convert them into equity to improve"'you't' balance 
sheet and give you more flexibility. 
Q. How do these interest rates compare with insurance interest-rates? 
A. It depends on what premium is set on the conversion; If it's a 20% 
premium or a 30% premium above existing market price ,it will effect the 
interest rates that are charged. I would say on balance in 'this time 
period a direct senior debt placement would have cost you one-half to a 
full point higher than these rates. 
Q. I think that the VA rate was 3/4 less and a point higher than these. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you do any borrowing from foreign countries? 
A. American has none, but some of the international carriers have done some. 
For a while in 1970 the Swiss market was a pretty good source.! You could 
deal in Eurodollars in a couple of other markets. That 'was equivalent 
to bank borrowing, short term borrowing. As an industry we did turn 
to bank borrowing ,but we were able by and large to get our domestic banks 
to loan at rates that were pretty close to the Eurodollar rate or even 
below most of the time. 
Q. This may not be appropriate now, but if you were unregulated in terms of 
fare structure would you be better able to cope with your current problem? 
A. Yes, I think there would be no question that, if we were unregulated in 
relation to rate structure, the financial community would feel more secure 
in lending to us and I suspect the equity investors would also feel more 
secure. Regulation in certain other areas, however, does give the senior 
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lenders and the equity investors some security. Regulation as a whole 
is a bit of a mixed bag, but rate regulations, per se, probably does cost 
us some points. 
So the insurance monies were dried up, we had run out of subordinated 
convertible opportunities essentially at the end of 1967 and we had to turn 
to the banks. (Chart XVI) The banks had been only a very minor factor up 
until the end of 1964. Of our total long-term debt at that point, the banks 
only had $291 million or 17%. At the end of this period, in 1971, we had total 
debt of $5.2 billion. Of the new debt placed in this time period, the banks 
took 27%% of it. Bank financing is probably the least attractive kind of 
financing that an airline can do. Your commitments are invariably long-term 
commitments. You're looking at purchases of aircraft which you anticipate 
will have 12 or 14 or 16 year lives. To go to the bank and finance on a five 
year type of financing makes little sense. In effect, you are commiting to 
finance that particular debt two or three times during the course of the life 
of that aircraft. Therefore, whenever possible, you try and do longer term 
financing. It wasn't possible in this period, so we did turn to the banks 
quite heavily. At year end 1971, the 12 carriers had $2.1 billion worth of 
authorized revolving credit at the banks and were using 44% of it, or just over 
$900 million. Most airlines view such credits first as something you're going 
to try to refinance as soon as possible, and second, as an insurance policy. 
It's awfully nice when you're trying to go to sleep at night to know that you 
have a $300 million revolver down at the bank and you're only using $50 million 
and use your insurance policy to tide you over until market', conditions improve. 
It's expensive insurance, however, and it's not something you carry just for 
!,:.':lL'I,.i/J ::' ;1' ,,": .. 1 ,1~:~: :::~.'dt £1"..-: (qL i...I~.j:·i::: .... :I!;\-· B!: .. '·-
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Finally, very late in 1969 the airline industry entered phase three of 
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this era: the use of a lease instrument very similar to a railroad equipment 
/'.i.; .. ': -;'ll..' ._.l~}_!!" ... :c,.)j J .... b;) ."i;--::.~,.j'~l~;H.:,i- I . .::"" -~';_. ,",'; 
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(Chart XVII) This was an instrument that TWA invented. 
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In December, 1969 they did a $70 million 747 guaranteed loan certificate 
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financing at a, 10% coupon rate. We seized upon this and American Airlines lease 
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financed seven 747's in three separate issues during 1970, representirig the 
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majority of this total of $248 million in 1970. We paid interest rates ranging 
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fr,,,!" about 10':'. Qnup-, ,.,1 '}l never for~~t our h,ighest rate, it was 11%. Another 
" , " ' '.1. ,'_ '.' -"q JII" ',I· t,: ,f ',! "~ ,.),. • ; ...; ': " 
was at 10 7/8':'. and I forget what the third issue was. Other carriers issued 
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lease certificates at ll~% and even a little higher. This was the nadir of the 
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airline financial picture during this time period. 
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Q • Who picked tRos'e :ilp'? 
A. Most of the Ones ,thaf lrufierric:iiri'did were sold publicly. It becomes a rather 
:, long term :ii'dnd'S'eta"t:fI.!'Wbl'i'(0).rt'~We>cao.:trpen: rat:es "shown on Chart XVII. You 
then, ofi!6utsi"~ Whe bea "1Tiv.P"€ruB't!elefS' ;o<>e1tC' r ':10()3 ,t 
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llu':A."These,were bJri'il's:'I'~l?l! iNtI!! ~dl§§il! ellujfl'@rwl¥t<!,Lgilaranteed by the corporation. 
In addition to representing a lien on the aircraft as security for the bond, 
we had to give a separate corporate guarantee in order to sell the bonds. 
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Q. You didn't tell us about the highest interest rate I've seen in public 
bonds? 
A. In this kind of financing you are selling 70% to 75% of the value of the 
aircraft in the form of long-term bonds to the public and 25% to 30% is 
being placed at very low interest rates with equity investors, usually 
banks who have unused investment tax credits. When one factors in the 
very low equity rates with the high bond coupon rates, you typically 
reduce them 3% to 3~% points in terms of the effective borrowing rates to 
the airline. The airline, of course, is giving up investment tax credit 
when it finances this way. I'm not taking account of that. 
Q. What was the term? 
A. We did ours on an 18 year term, most were done on a 16 year term. 
Q. Were these callable bonds? 
A. They are not callable, they are actually paid out just like you payout 
a lease every six months. You're paying off 1/36th or 1/32nd of the face 
value of the total bond twice a year. 
Chart XVIII is as good a summary of the difficulties that the airlines 
were in in 1971 as any I can think of. I don't know how many of you are familiar 
with the New York State Insurance Laws and with similar insurance laws in many 
other states. This law says that the airline, or any corporation to whom an 
insurance company makes a loan, must have cash flow equivalent to 1.5 times the 
fixed interest obligations for the year. Any loans to corporations that fail 
to meet that test in one of the last two years or on average in the last five 
years are put into a special pot and the insurance company has to increase its 
reserve against that particular loan. Normally an insurance company will carry 
.' 
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a 1% to 2% reserve against a loan. If you fail this test, however, that 
will jump to 10% or 20%, depending upon the state. The insurance company 
just will not loan when they fear that they may have to reserve 10% to 2~~ 
against the loan. If they would, the rate would be so hi~h that no airline 
would be interested in it.' American failed this test for the first time in 
1970 and was still under in 1971 so we're not eligible at the moment to borrow 
on an unsecured basis from insurance companies, except under this very high 
reserve position. Eastern has been·under since 1969, Pan Am has been under 
since, I believe, before 1969, TWA has also been under for three years. 
United passed in 1969 and then fell out of bed, ~raniff has .een under throughout 
the three years, Continental was under for two, they ~id make it in 1971. Western 
has been under for the last two years. There are only three carriers today that 
could go to an insurance company and say I want to borrow some money and the 
insurance man would smile. They are Delta, National and Northwest. This is 
an interesting test to watch since it means it is going to be at least a couple 
of years .efore we as an industry have real acceSs to the insurance company 
market. 
Q. Have the insurance companies lost anything on their airline loans? 
A. They haven't lost anything but when they see figures of this kind their 
insurance examiners talk to them pretty seriously about how secure is this 
debt. I went down with Mr. Spater in 1968 and talked to the Chairman of the 
Board of one of the very large insurance companies and he said we're not 
going to loan you another cent until you get your current obligation to us 
down by 33%. That's about $65 million and it's going to be 1980 before we 
get it that far down on the current repayment schedule. 
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Q. You defined the fixed charges there as interest and amortization of debt? 
A. Yes that's correct. Interest and amortization of the debt and scheduled 
debt/repayments. 
Q. Don, this thing includes rentals? 
A. And it does include rentals, yes. 
Q. Moreover the ICC has a less onerous test? 
A. The ICC has a less onerous test. Under the New York State Insurance Law 
airlines must include full lease payments whereas the railroads need only 
inc lude the irnpu ted interest cost portion of lease payments. 
Q. Your answer to a question previously.asked about oil company money would be 
that the insurance companies possibly have something better to do with their 
money? 
A. Loan to other people? 
Q. Yes. 
A. That's what they have been doing to a very large extent. You can sometimes 
intrigue them with Some of the high coupon rates on the guaranteed lease 
certificates. We did ge~ some insurance companies to participate at lO~% 
and 11% kinds of rates. Naturally, they like that, because they have the 
security of the aircraft and they've got the total guarantee of the whole 
corporation. That's a pretty good piece of paper. It's pretty hard to 
tempt them, as yet, with less security or with much lower interest rates. 
Q. Why wouldn't that same rate attract other investors? 
A. It did. For example, a number of pension funds participated in these guaranteed 
lease certificates from allover the country as did banks and private 
individuals. 
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Finally, in the spring of 1971 the airlines got a break. The big 
investment funds began to believe that 1972 and beyond were going to be very 
good airline earnings years and airline stocks shot up to double or a little 
more than double their recession lows. This enabled each of the big five 
carriers to do equity financing in fairly significant quantities, amounting to 
increases in shares outstanding ranging from 11% up to 15%. (Chart XIX) You 
could well see some more such financing. Continental has just completed one in 
July of 1972, a $27 million issue representing a 10% increase in their shares 
outstanding. There are other smaller carriers who could follow suit, but I 
don't think you'll see a lot more of it unless market conditions improve 
substantially from today's levels. 
Q. What's the cost of that? 
A. The cost of equity financing? Generally, you have to figure that equity 
financing in this industry costs you about 15%. It depends, of course, 
on what you think your cost of capital is and you base your calculations 
primarily on the expectations of the guy who invests and your historical growth 
in earnings per share than on anything else. It is expensive, but there comes 
a point after you've borrowed so much where you have to raise equity to get 
your balance sheet back in shape. 
Q. You show that Continental on the previous chart has been eligible for insurance 
borrowing. Why did they let them do this instead? 
A. Well, I'm not really sure. When they bought their DC-lO's they went very 
heavily into a bank loan. This was in the fall of 1970. They had to get 
out of the banks, to whom they were further heavily commited, and find some 
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means of lengthening their terms. Continental has a very high debt equity 
ratio. It may be because of their debt equity ratio that the insurance 
companies just didn't want to loan to them. They may have had to do 
something to their equity side to get their balance sheet looking better. 
In summarizing then, in the 1967-1971 time period, for the first time 
since 1956, the industry failed to generate half of its commitments internally. 
(Chart XX) We only generated 48%. Debt increased by $3.3 billion and as I 
indicated, it was bank debt and subordinated convertible debt in large part. 
Leases for the first time became a major factor in the sourcing of funds, 
accounting for 16% of the total monies raise~ during that time period. In the 
latter years of this period half or more of the aircraft being delivered to the 
carriers were being leased, because that was the most efficient available kind 
of financing. Equity money, raised mainly in 1970, represented just under 10% 
of the money sourced. In all, we spent $11.9 billion. Dividends again dropped 
as a percentage, down to 3.6% of our fund usage, and of course all but a couple 
of carriers had suspended any dividend payments by the conclusion of this time 
period. 
Looking now at the balance sheet at year-end 1971, (Chart XXI) working capital 
was $360 million, actually down in dollar terms from where it had been six years 
earlier. Operating property had quadrupled during the same period and other assets 
rose about two and half times. Debt had risen sharply to $5.2 billion from 
$1.9 billion six years earlier and represented 44% of total capitalization. For 
the first time leases suddenly emerged as a factor at $2.2 billion or 19%. They 
had only been $200 million six years before. Stockholder equity also rose, to 
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$3.3 billion.from $1.7. billion, but you can see on the next chart the ad,verse 
change in the ratio of debt to equity. (Ch~rt XXII) 
The current ratio had fallen sharply to 1.18. You can live weith .. tll.is 
level, bu~ it can't go much lower. The debt-equity ratio which had ri'len from 
0.4 in 1954 to about 1.2 in the 1960's, has now jumped to 1.56 at the end of 
1971. Including leases, the ratio was now up to 2.22. Stated another way, 70% 
6f our total capitalization was debt and capitalized leases. 
Now let's look at the future and oddly enough, George James forecasted 
'. 
capital requirements don't pose much of a problem in the 1972-1975 period. 
Q. Can I interrupt. Your times interest coverage, was it 1.1? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That 10%, is that all you have to cover dividends and repayment of .pri~cip1e? 
A. That's correct. I suspect we .just lost another potential investor.he;-e. 
Q. Your problem is bigger than I can handle. 
On the balance sheet chart for the end of 1971 we saw that our total 
capitalization, excluding leases, was about $9.7 billion. Dr. James has forecasted 
for the 1971-1975 period that the commitments of the airlines will be about 
$7 billion. That produces a commitment to capitalization ratio thatfs totally 
different from anything we've been looking at. You will recall that these ratios 
for the previous time periods were: 1954-1959 - 2.8; 1960-1965 - 2.1; 1966-1971 -
2.8. In contrast commitments now are actually less than the capitalization 
.' 
of the airlines going into this 1972-1975 time period resulting in a ratio of 
only 0.7. There should be relatively no problem in sourcing these funds. 
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The next chart (Chart XXIII) is an American Airlines sources and uses 
of funds schedule. It shows you what a typical.carrier like ourselves went 
through in 1971 and what we've been going through in 1972. In 1971, we spent 
about $250 million for aircraft, another $140 million for facility expenditures, 
a little bit for debt retirement and about $20 million for other uses, including 
dividends. Our sources included depreciation at a little over $100 million 
and deposits with manufacturers,which had been made previously and were applied 
at the time of delivery of the aircraft, of $45 million. That left us with a 
short-fall of some $300 million. To bridge this gap we used leasing heavily, 
principally the equipment trust certificates that I referred to earlier, and 
we began to use our revolving credit in 1971 for the first time. We also did 
an $85 million equity issue. So, we were scrambling, we used leasing; we used 
revolving bank credit; we used equity financing; we used everything we could 
find to lay our hands on in 1971. And we met this total commitment of about 
$450 million. 
In 1972 American Airlines still has very heavy commitments, about $430 
million in all. Some 19 DC-10's are being delivered to us in 1972. That means 
we have aircraft financing requirements alone of $350 million this year. In the 
facilities area we appear to be over the hump, as is the industry generally, I 
think. The big facility expenditures you saw in the 1969-1971 period are a 
thing of the past, at least for this equipment cycle. For American they should 
now run somewhere in the neighborhood of $30 million on a continuing basis for 
several years. Finally, we have debt retirement of about $30 million. On the 
sources side of the ledger, depreciation will provide about $110 million and 
deposits another $140 million because we're taking delivery of so many aircraft. 
This leaves us with a gap to fill which will be met primarily through leasing and, 
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hopefully, some profits. We also, of course, have substantial unused revolving 
credit. We will use that, of course, to fill the portion of this gap that is not 
filled by other means. 
Now, look what happens to our capital requirements in 1973. No aircraft 
are on order for 1973 delivery. The same is true for 1974, and at the moment, 
at least, for 1975. So there are no aircraft commitments to fund. The ground 
facility expenditures should average only about $30 million. Finally, there 
are debt retirements of about $30 million which brings us up to a total of 
about $60 odd million funds required for the year 1973. On the source side, 
our depreciation will be $125 million and normally we have about $30 million 
in other odds and ends. We have then about $150 million of sources, plus an 
opportunity to earn money above that. There should, therefore, be a substantial 
positive cash flow for the airlines in the 1973-1975 time period. This is the 
first time that there has been more than one year of a positive cash flow for the 
airlines in the post-war period. It says we have no new financing problems until 
1975. 
If you add the anticipated cash sources and uses over the next four years 
to the industry's 1971 balance sheet, you derive the 1975 balance sheet for the 
airline industry, shown on Chart XXIV .. For this purpose we have assumed 
working capital will be unchanged. In the area of operating property, we have 
added the aircraft deliveries forcasted by Dr. James. Other assets have been 
increased nominally. On the liability side the industry's positive cash flow 
should reduce debt by $700,000. We have assumed that about 30% of the new 
deliveries will be leased, so lease commitments go up from $2.2 to $2.7 billion. 
Deferred credits also go up, leaving stockholder equity to rise by 50%. 
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This 1975 balsnce sheet looks a lot healthier than the current one. The 
debt-equity ratio, excluding capitalized, leases, is 0.9. In other words, the 
industry should have more equity than debt {or the first time in a long, long 
time. Even if you include capitalized leases, the debt equity ratio is only 
1.4, which is quite a tolerable level. In deriving this 1975 picture we have 
assumed that earnings recover steadily in 1972 and beyond, but that they don't 
recover all the way to the 12% rate of return by any means. We have assumed 
that the industry will resume paying dividends in 1973, with about a 1/3 
payout of earnings after taxes. Finally, we have assumed that those convertible 
issues which are callable reasonably near their current stock market prices 
will be called during this time period. 
Q. What happens to your times interest ratio now? 
A. I didn't calculate it, but we improve markedly from today's levels. 
Q. Back up to the 13 level? 
A. Oh no. We would be back to a point where we qualify for insurance test 
purposes. I think it would get back into the 3-5 range. 
Q. If all the airlines had a moratorium, no new equipment for five or six years, 
and if there was a traffic buildup, could you sort of have a guaranteed 
recovery? 
A. We have the cash position for that to happen, but the earnings would be the 
question mark. We have assumed a fairly good level of earnings in this 
analysis. Realization of those earnings depends on how we meet our growth. 
If it is done through high load factor, yes we ought to have the recovery. 
Let's turn now to my last slide. (Chart XXV) Until yesterday I thought that 
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Dr • James was going to fOICecast commiments of $13 billion in the last half 
of the decade, but he has come up with a figure of $20 billion. '0ne mu&t 
put that $20 billion in perspective to understand the challenge that it c-reate·s 
for the airline industry. At the end of 1975, on the balance sheet we··just 
looked at, the capitalization of the airlines should be about $11 bilHon .. 
The $20 billion commitment versus the $11 billion capitalization results in 
a ratio of 1.8. Remember we have lived with ratios of 2.8, 2.1 snd' 2.·8 in" 
the past. That should indicate that we ought to be able to live with .'something 
less than 2. 
Nonetheless, there are problems. First, it is questionable whether the 
insurance companies will provide a major source of long-term funds. i second, . 
the industry has existing bank credits of about a billion dollars which, I 
doubt, will be expanded very much. Third, I believe we will lease something 
like 30% of our new aircraft, but probably not much more than 30% can be 
leased because of covenant restrictions. Leasing also becomes quite expensive 
unless we continue to have investment tax credits. Convertible debt is a 
possibility, but its availability depends upon the stock market price. We will 
have a flow of $7 billion from depreciation in the 1976-1980 time period, but 
relative to the forecasted $20 billion commitment this would represent a minor 
contribution. We have never fallen significantly short of financing about half 
of our commitments from internal sources, i.e., depreciation plus earnings. 
In order to maintain that record the industry needs to earn about $3 billion in 
this five year time period. That is equal to $600 million per year after tax 
on average. Earnings then are the key to whether or not we can meet this kind 
of a commitment without ruining ourselves in the process. 
\ 
1 
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Q. Will you repeat that last statement? 
A. In the past, I said, we have generated approximately half or more than 
half of our fixed commitments from internally generated funds. In the 
latter half of the 1970's we will have $7 billion in depreciation, compared 
to the $20 billion commitment. So to close the gap, we need another 
$3 billion to total $10 billion or 50%. That $3 billion has to be earnings. 
If you divide that by five, you get $600 million per year after tax. 
Q. What's the total cash flow? 
A. Today, for the industry depreciation is running about $875 million 
per year. Earnings, according to Mr. Secor Browne, should be in the 
neighborhood of $250 million this year for the airlines. 
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
1. SUSCEPTIBLE TO EUSIl<"'ESS CYCLE. 
2. SERVICE INDUSTRY. 
3. CLOSELY GOVERNNENT REGULATED. 
(ROUTES, RATES, SAFETY) 
4. HIGHLY COMPETITIVE. 
S. HIGH GRO';lTH. 
6. RAPID TECHNOLOGICAL CHA1~GE. 
7. CAPITAL HUNGRY. 
8. HIGHLY SEASONAL. 
SEASON I 
THE EQUITY PERIOD 
UP TO 12/31/54 
BALANCE SHEET 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
YEAR END 1954 
($ millions) 
Working Capital $128 
Operating Property 581 
Other Assets 71 
Debt $214 
15 
551 
% of 
Capital!.zation 
27.4% 
Deferred Credits 
Stockholders' Equity 
39{) 
1.9 
70.7 
CHART II 
..... 
KEY FINANCING RATIOS 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
Current Ratio 
Debt/Equity 
Debt/Equity 
(incl. Leases) 
Times Interest Coverage 
1951, 
1.39 
.39 
.39 
13 .3 
CHART III 
AIRCRAFT CaMr.1ITMENTS 
MAJOR U.S. AIRLINES 
fIILLtONS OF DOLLARS 
10-
8-
6-
4-
2-
0--
1955 - 1959 
CHART IV 
SEASON II 
THE INSURANCE CO. PERIOD 
1955 - 1959 
SOURCES & USES 'OF FUNDS 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
1955-1959 
($ millions) 
Sources % of Total 
I.nterna'l 
Debt' 
Leases 
Equity 
Capital Expenditures 
Dividends 
$1305 
841 
42 
186 
$2212 
162 
55.07. 
35.4 
1.8 
7.8 
93.270 
6.8 
CHART V 
BALANCE SHEE'r 
HAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
YEAR END 1959 
($ millions) 
Working Capital 
Operating Property 
Ot~r Assets 
. Debt 
Deferred Credits 
Stockholders' Equity 
$ 188 
1562 
309 
$1055 
124 
880 
% of 
Capitalization 
51.2'7 • 
6.0 
42.8 
CHART VI 
KEY FINANCING RATIOS 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
1954 
Current Ratio 1.39 
Debt/Equity .39 
Debt/Equity .39 
(incl. Leases) 
Times Interest Coverage 13 .3 
CHART VII 
1959 
'., ',f ' . .:" 
1.33 
" 
1.20 
1.25 
3.1 
AIRCRAFt COMMITMENTS 
MAJOR U.S. AIRLINES 
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS 
10-
6-
4-
2-
1955 . 1959 1960 . 1965 
CHART VIII 
. SEASON III. 
INTERNALLY FINANCED GROWTH 
SOURCES & USES OE' FUNDS 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
1960-1965 
($ millions) 
Sources i; of Total 
Internal $3174 70.6% 
Debt 854 19.0 
Leases 175 3.9 
.Equity 290 6.5 
Uses 
Capital Expenditures $4260 9/,.R7, 
Dividends 233 5.2 
3q7 
CllART IX 
· il 
BAUNCE SlIEET-
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
YEAR END 1965 
($ millions) 
Working Capital 
Operating Property 
Other Assets 
$ 378 
3352 
488 
Debt 
teases 
$1908 
218 
431 
1661 
% of 
Capital hat ion 
45.2'1. 
De fer red Credit s 
Stockholders' Equity 
5.2 
10.2 
39.4 
11 includes capitalized leases for aircraft 
CHART X 
KEY FINANCING RATIOS 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
1954 
Current Ratio 1.39 
Debt/Equity .39 
Debt/Equity .39 
(inc1. Leases) 
Times Interest Coverage 13.3 
'- ,.' ) ' 
1959 J965 
1.33 1.39 
1.20 1.15 
1.25 1.28 
3.1 6.6 
. , 
. , 
CHART Xl 
.~~ ~.'l;!,;~,,~.,'''''.' 
. , 
, 
, . 
". 
AtReRAf:t COMMITMENTS 
MAJOR U.S. AIRLINES 
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS 
10'" 
8-
8-
\955 . 1959 
CHART XII 
1960 . 1965 1966 . 1971 
CHART XIII 
SEASON IV 
GET IT WHERE YOU CAN 
THE SECOND HALF OF THE DECADE 
MOST·FINANCING SOURCES DRIED UP OR BECAME VERY EXPENSIVE 
INTEREST RATES RISING 
INSURANCE COMPANIES NOT WILLING TO INCREASE LENDING 
PROSPECTIVE EQUITY INVESTORS SEEKING HIGHER DIVIDEND YIELDS 
AIRLINE EQUITY MARKET ANTICIPATING DECLINING EARNINGS 
BUT CONSIDERABLE EXTERNAL FINANCING WAS NECESSARY TO MEET THE 
COMMITMENTS FOR NEW AIRCRAFT. MORE EXPENSIVE SOURCES OF FINANCING 
HAD TO BE TAPPED 
a. SUBORDINATED CONVERTIBLE DEBENTURES 
b. BANK CREDITS 
c. LEASING 
#()/ 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
SOURCE OF LONG TER}! DEBT 
INSllRANCE COMPANIE1j 
($ millions) 
Total Long Term Debt at Year End 1959 
Debt Held by Insurance Companies 
Insurance Debt as % of Total 
Total Lohg Term Debt at Year End 1968 
Debt Held by Insurance Companies 
Insurance Debt as % of Total 
% of New Debt Financed 
lly Ins\lrance Companies 
$1,055 
706 
66.9% 
$4,592 
1,713 
37.3% 
28.5% 
CHART XIV 
Repre~ent~tive Companies % of 1968 Insurance Total 
Netropolitan 
Prudential 
Equitable 
John Hancock 
Aetna 
l'1ulu.al Lii~ of ~~~W York 
Connecticut General 
Others 
30.1% 
21.2 
12.7 
5.3 
5.0 
3.5 
3.3 
la.9 
1959 
1961 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
CONVERTIBLE DEBT FINANCING 
PUBLICLY ISSUED 
Amount 
$ 47 
10 
60 
53 
382 
508 
80 
325 
80 
($ millions) 
Average 
Interest Rate 
4.9% 
6.0 
4.5 
4.0 
5.0 
4.3 
4.9 
5.1 
8.0 
% Outstanding 
At Year End 1971 
8.5% 
o 
41.7 
o 
77.5 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
o 
CHART XV 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
SOURCE OF LONG TERM DEBT 
BANKS 
($ millions) 
Total Long Term Debt at Year End· 1964 
Debt Held by Banks 
Bank Debt as % of Total 
Total Long Term Debt at Year End 1971 
Debt Held by Banks 
Bank Debt as % of Total 
:.;. "r NeH Debt Financed by Banks 
Revolving Credit Agreements 
At Year End 1971 
t.vailab1e Credit Authorized 
Amount Ilorro,"ed 
$1,689 
291 
17.2% 
$5,194 
1,256 
24.2% 
27.5% 
$2,120 
908 
CHART XVI 
1969 
1970 . 
1971 
}~JOR U. S. AIRLINES 
GUARANTEED LOAN· CERTIFICATES 
($ millions) 
Amount 
$ 70 
248 
103 
Average Conpon Interest Rate 
10.m; 
11.1 
10.7 
CHART XVII 
NAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
COVERAGE QF FtXED CHARGES 
American 
Eastern 
Pan Am 
~A 
United 
Braniff 
Continental 
Delta 
National 
Northl1est 
Western 
1969 
-
1.55 
I .9-'" l...lJ! 
[:I~ 
1.88 
lL131 [G1] 
3.87 
3.09 
6.51 
* 
* 3.13 
rn 
1971 
~ ([;]] 
[cij 
ri..@ 
[:-t~l 
1.56 
2.97 
1.77 
* ~ 
CHART XVIII 
~ does not meet requirement of N. Y. State 
Insurance Law for coverage by 1.5 times. 
* not representative because of strike. 
April 1971 
Hay 1971 
June 1971 
July 1971 
Hay 1972 
July 1972 
MAJOR U. S, AIRLINES 
RECENT EQUITY FINANCING 
($ millions) 
CHART XIX 
Company. 
Increase in 
Amount Shares Outstanding 
Pan Am .. $ 67.0 11.2% 
United 88.8 13 .6 
American 89.9 15.7 
TWA 37.9 14 ;2 
Eastern 54.3 11.7 
Continental 27 .0 10.6 
TOTAL $364.9 
SOURCES & USES OF FUNDS 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
1966-1971 
Sources 
Internal 
Debt 
'Leases 
Equity 
Uses 
($ millions) 
$ 5929 
3322 
2001 
1132 
Capital Expenditures $11934 
Dividends 450 
% 'of Total 
47.9% 
26.8 
16.2 
9.1 
96.4% 
3.6 
CHART XX 
BALANCE SHEETli 
MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
YEAR END 1971 
($ millions) 
Working Capital 
Operating Property 
Other Assets 
Debt 
Leases 
Deferred Credits 
Stockholders' Equity 
$ 363 
10147 
1360 
$ 5230 
2219 
1064 
3357 
% of 
Capital i~ati_~'p" 
44.1% 
18.7 
9.0 
28.2 
1/ includes capitalized leases for aircraft 
CHART XXI 
CHART XXII 
KEY FINANCING RATIOS 
MAJOR U,S. AIRLINES 
1954 1959 1965 1971 
Current Ratio 1.39 1.33 1.39 1.18 
Debt/Equity .39 1.20 1.15 1.56 
Debt/Equity .39 1.25 1.28 2.22 
(incl. Leases) 
Times Interest Coverage 13.3 3.1 6.6 1.1 
• 
$ MILLIONS 
500-
SOURCES A"JD USES OF FUNDS 
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC, 
1971 . 1973 
DIVIDENDS EARSINGS 
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MAJOR U. S. AIRLINES 
COMPARATIVE BALANCE SHEET 
ESTlllATED 1975 v.s. 1971 
($ billions) 
1971 
Working Capital $J; 
Operating Property 10.1 
Other As se ts 1.4 
Debt $ 5.2 
l,eases 2.2 
Deferred Credits 1.1 
Stockholders' Equity 3.4 
Key R~tios 
Current Ratio 1.18 
Debt/Equity 1.56 
Debt/Equity 2.22 
(incl Leases) . 
Basic Assumptions 
1975 
$ .4 
11.6 
1.7 
$ 4.5 
2.7 
1.4 
5.1 
1.15 
.89 
1.41 
• Eflrnings recover, but he I m,l 127" return 
- Dividends resumed at 1/3 payout 
- Convertibles called as equity prices 
improve 
- Capital comm~tments at $6 billion 
CHART XXIV 
THE SECOND HALF OF TilE DECADE 
($ billions) 
Commitments 
1976 - 1980 
Sources of Funds 
Debt 
Insurance Companies 
Banks-Existing Credit 
Leasing 
Convertible Debt 
Depreciation 
Earnings 
Equity 
New Alternatives 
$20 
Nominal 
$1 
Limited & Expensive 
Dilution 
$7 
? 
Dependent Upon 
Earnings 
? 
CHART XXV 
